We compare the intraday pattern of bid-ask spread, depth, and order flow of warrants and their underlying stocks on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. We find that, under the same market architecture, they have a similar downward sloping pattern of spreads, adverse selection component, and liquidity immediacy, U-shaped for volatility and trading volume, and upward-sloping for depth and market order ratio. We show that, after controlling for the intraday patterns, spreads are positively associated with liquidity immediacy and negatively related to the market order ratio and total depth. The results support the presence of competition among limit order traders and strategic order submission. 
brokerage firms submit their orders on-line to the ASSET system and the orders are arranged according to price-then-time priority. Under the PT, brokers can deal and negotiate directly between each other, where the price can be changed and may not follow the price spread rules. When the negotiation is done, the result will be sent to the ASSET system for approval. Only trading on the special board and the big lot board can be done on PT system. The foreign board can use both AOM and PT systems.
Trading on the SET is conducted on Monday through Friday excluding public holidays in two trading sessions each day. The morning and afternoon sessions start from 10:00 am to 12:30 pm and 14:30 pm to 16:30 pm respectively. 2 The ASSET determines the opening price in the morning and afternoon sessions of each security from all valid orders in the system by a call market. The opening price is determined according to three criteria. First, the opening price must generate the highest trading volume. Second, if more than one price share the highest trading volume, the price closest to the preceding closing price will be chosen. Third, after passing the first two criteria, if there is still more than one price, the highest price becomes opening price.
The ASSET allows traders to place six order types: a market order, an at-the open order, an at-the-close order, an immediate-or-cancel order, a fill-or-kill order, and a conditioned published order. The market order is simply an order to buy or sell securities at the best prevailing price. The at-the-open order or at-the-close order is an order to buy or sell securities at the opening price or at the closing price. The immediate-or-cancel order is an order to buy or sell securities immediately at a specific price. If there is any remaining volume unmatched, the remaining volume will be canceled. The fill-or-kill order is an order to buy or sell the whole ordered volume at a specific price. If this condition cannot be met, the order will be canceled. The conditioned published order is an order that allows a trader to reveal some portion of her order size and hide the remaining from the public. The volume of a published order must have at least 10 board lots, and also indicate an equal number of shares to be published or revealed. When the revealed portion is transacted, the next portion is placed in the queue until the whole ordered volume is completely transacted.
Warrants and stocks are traded on the main board under the same trading rules. The SET imposes a minimum tick size rule and floor and ceiling price limits on the main board. On December 1, 1997, the SET introduced a new floor and ceiling price limit rule and also implemented a circuit breaker rule. Under the previous price limit rule, the price of a security could move within a range of ±10 percent relative to its previous closing price. The new price limit rule allows a wider fluctuation with a range of ±30 percent. For securities priced less than one baht, their prices are allowed to fluctuate within a range of ±100 percent. For the circuit breaker rule, if the SET index falls by 10% from the previous day's close, trading of all listed securities will be halted for 30 minutes. If the SET index falls by 20% from the previous day's close, trading of all listed securities will be halted for one hour. If time left in the trading session is less than 30 minutes for the case of the 10% fall or one hour for the case of the 20% fall, trading will be halted until the closing time of that session, and will be resumed in the following session.
[Insert Table 1 here] Table 1 shows details of the various tick sizes in both absolute and relative values. Panel A of Table 1 reports seven ranges of prices that define the minimum tick size from a lowest tick of 0.10 baht to a highest tick of 6.00 baht. For securities with prices below 10 baht, the minimum tick size could be very large relative to the price. In general, the 2 Local time of Thailand is GMT + 7:00 minimum tick size is more than 0.5%, but less than 1.0% of the price. The use of various minimum tick sizes suggests that the SET attempts to control the variation of the relative tick sizes across price ranges. This argument is strengthened when the SET decided to implement the new minimum tick size rule effective on November 5, 2001. Panel B of Table 1 shows the price ranges and the minimum tick sizes used under the new rule. Obviously, the relative tick sizes under the new rule have less variation than those under the old rule.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Many studies show that trading mechanisms have a significant effect on the intraday pattern of trade and quote variables. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) find that the distribution of open-to-open returns has greater dispersion, higher mode, and fatter tails than the distribution of close-to-close returns. They argue that the low variation of close-to-close returns stems from the fact that market makers try to stabilize prices and to alleviate their cumulative inventory imbalance. They conclude that the open-to-open returns would capture the price behavior in a call market used at the opening trade while the price impact of marketmakers' influence should be concentrated in the close-to-close returns. Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) and Chan, Chung, Johnson (1995) argue that the difference of market power between the specialists in the NYSE and the dealers in the NASDAQ and CBOE cause intraday variation in bid-ask spreads. They find that bid-ask spreads for NYSE stocks follow a U-shaped pattern, but spreads of NASDAQ stocks and CBOE options traded near the market closure are narrower.
Besides the trading mechanisms, the intraday patterns are also associated with the behavior of informed traders, especially when and what they trade. Black (1975) argues that options trading should provide two advantages: financial leverage and volatility trading. Several studies, e.g., Manaster and Rendleman (1982) , Anthony (1988) , Vijh (1990) , Stephan and Whaley (1990) , investigate the interrelationship between option and stock markets, but they find no conclusive answer for which market informed traders initiate their trade. Chan, Chung and Fong (2002) explain that the lower liquidity in options market compared to stock markets make informed trader hesitate to initiate trade in options market. Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) show that depending on the depths and the availability of leverage, informed traders may pool and trade in both option and stock markets, or separate their trades in one market. Brock and Kleidon (1992) suggest that the non-trading period during market closure causes the price discovery process to deviate from equilibrium; therefore the degree of asymmetric information is largest at the opening. Moreover, right after market closures, liquidity traders may participate in trading more than other periods. The market closure impact implied by Brock and Kleidon (1992) is not limited only to the stock market. Other markets such as the options market should exhibit the similar U-shaped pattern as in the stock market. However, since the values of derivative securities are determined solely by the movement of their underlying assets, the intraday patterns of trade and quote related variables for options and stocks should not be different, no matter in which market the informed traders initiate their trades. As a result, the following hypothesis would be held.
Hypothesis 1: Warrants and stocks should have the similar intraday patterns of trade and quote related variables.
A number of studies document both intraday and interday U-shaped patterns of trading volume. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) , for example, explain that these patterns result from the strategic behavior of liquidity traders and informed traders. Traders adjust their transactions to avoid times when trading costs are high. Informed traders only trade when they can make a profit out of their information whereas market makers have full knowledge of the order flows and set prices to reflect the asset value. If we measured the traders' performance with the market return, trading is just a zero-sum game. This means that the informed traders will trade and profit from the liquidity traders. Hence, for the price to be informative, the presence of liquidity trader is necessary. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that, in equilibrium, liquidity traders concentrate their trades in periods close to the realization of their demand. The trading concentration would in turn attract informed traders to trade against them. However, it is still an optimal strategy for the liquidity traders because the trading cost is minimized when they trade around the same time of the day. This model implies that, during periods of high trading volume, prices are relatively informative and trading cost low. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) argue that the private information of informed traders becomes less valuable over time because portion of the private information is revealed to the public through news everyday. Liquidity traders, therefore, have an incentive to postpone their trades during the period when informed traders remain in the market. Liquidity traders can receive private information by waiting for public announcements. If the information accumulated by an informed trader is higher during the weekend, assuming that the accuracy of a public announcement during the weekend is not different than an overnight one, the adverse selection problem would be more severe on Monday than on other days. It results in low trading volume and high trading cost on Monday, when informed traders exercise their private information because they know that their information is short-lived. The trading pattern should be more pronounced for firms with more and better public information. Consequently, informed traders trade aggressively before the information is released to the public, and liquidity traders delay their trading. It is therefore plausible to infer the private information from that period. Again, when the trading volume is lower, prices are more informative and trading costs are higher.
Conversely, neither the game theoretical model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) nor the model of Foster and Viswanathan (1990) implies the higher spread and volume at the market opening and closing. Brock and Kleidon (1992) point out that passive portfolio managers choose to trade at the end of trading day because the performance of these funds are measured on how closely the fund tracks an index. The tracking error would be smaller when trading at the end of period since the index is calculated using closing prices. Moreover, their model predicts that liquidity risk is higher when holding on to securities that are not allowed to trade. Moreover, investors may opt to trade at the market open in order to adjust their portfolio imbalances during the non-trading interval, and trade again at the market close to adjust their portfolio for optimal overnight holding. This results in a higher trading activity at the beginning and the ending of a trading interval. A higher volume at the end of a period may also come from the trades of institutional investors to mimic an index. The arguments of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Viswanathan (1993), and Brock and Kleidon (1992) lead us to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The trading volume is high at the opening and at the closing.
Price volatility could be a result of a permanent price movement due to a new information arrival, a temporary price change due to liquidity trading, or both. Observing a high volatility during trading periods does not tell us the source of the volatility. On one hand, the high volatility during trading periods could stem from temporary price changes due to liquidity trading. On the other hand, new public information arrive frequently during business hours, and hence results in the high volatility during trading periods. French and Roll (1986) separate these two arguments of volatility. They compare the volatility over the special event, while the New York Stock Exchange closes for two days, other business entities stay opened, with the volatility over the normal weekday period. If the information arrival is the only source of volatility, the variance over two weekdays exchange holiday should be double of normal weekday variance. Their results show that the variance of two weekday exchange holidays was only 14% higher than those of the normal period. This result supports that trading is also an important source of volatility. Harvey and Huang (1991) show that the pattern of volatility variation may reflect information flow. They find that because the concentration of US macroeconomic announcements on Thursday and Friday, the volatility in US foreign exchange market is higher for all currencies during the first hour of Friday trading. Additionally, a contagion effect causes the increase or decrease of volatility in one market as a result of the activity in another market. King and Wadhwani (1990) propose a model where traders in one market infer the information from another market, resulting in market integration. They predict a volatility drop when an associated market closes. Their empirical results show that the volatility on the London market declined when the US stock markets are shut down on Wednesday during the second half of 1968. Chan, Fong, Kho and Stulz (1996) find that European stocks listed on the US stock market have high volatility during the early morning compared to American stocks with similar daily volume and volatility.
The past studies have shown that volatility is determined by the trading activity and information flow. Moreover, the liquidity traders cluster their trades and attract informed traders around the opening and closing periods. The intraday pattern of volatility should be similar to those of volume. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
The volatility is high at the opening and at the closing of trading session.
Previous literatures view the bid-ask spread as a measure of trading cost measurement or a compensation to market makers for order processing cost, inventory cost and asymmetric information cost. Garman (1976), and Ho and Stoll (1980) show that market makers face an inventory imbalance due to uncertainty of buy and sell order arrivals. Hence, the inventory imbalance would likely be the most severe at the closing of the market. To mitigate the inventory imbalance problem, dealers use bid-ask spreads to manage their inventory by increasing bid or lowering ask quotes to attract buy and sell orders from others. Madhavan (1992) points out that the asymmetric information problem should be alleviated over trading days because trading is a process to incorporate both private and public information into price. As a result, the asymmetric information component in the bid-ask spread should decline, and consequently makes the total bid-ask spread fall throughout the trading day.
Although the early study by McInish and Wood (1992) reports the U-shape pattern of spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE, the intraday patterns of spreads found on other exchanges are different. Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995) compare the intraday pattern of spreads for actively traded CBOE options and their NYSE traded underlying stocks. They find that the bid-ask spread pattern of options is different from that of the underlying stocks. While both options and stocks have a wide spread at the open, their spreads are different at the close. At the close, the spreads of options are narrow while the spreads of the stocks become wide again. They explain that the difference in spread variation arises from the differences in the market architecture used by the two markets. The CBOE let market makers compete with each other, whereas the market making at the NYSE is monopolistic. Consistent with the competing hypothesis, Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) , and AffleckGraves, Hegde, and Miller (1992) find that the bid-ask spread for NASDAQ stocks declines throughout the day. Based on these arguments, the following hypothesis should be held.
Hypothesis 4:
The bid-ask spread is high at the opening and declines throughout the day. Hypothesis 5: An adverse selection component in bid-ask spread falls throughout the day. Copeland and Galai (1983) point out that the bid and ask quotes placed by market makers can be viewed as a straddle option, where the difference of the straddle exercise prices forms the bid-ask spread. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) find that during the earning announcement period, specialists would quote a wide spread with a small depth to counter their asymmetric information risk. In a pure limit order market, liquidity providers receive the spread as compensation for their inventory costs and adverse selection cost. Hence the availability of depth should be negatively associated to the presence of informed traders. In addition, since the degree of asymmetric information declines over the course of trading, the depth in a limit order book should increase throughout the trading day. This leads to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 6:
Depth is low at the opening and increases throughout the day. Hypothesis 7: There is an inverse relationship between bid-ask spread and depth. Brock and Kleidon (1992) argue that fund managers who replicate an index movement movement likely submit market orders to execute their trades around the market close. Trading at the market close could help minimize tracking error since the index level is generally computed from the closing prices of its constituency stocks. Moreover, day traders also use market order to close their positions around the closing period. Thus, if we define the market order ratio as the number of market orders divided by the number of total orders, we hypothesize that.
Hypothesis 8: Market order ratio is low at the opening and increases throughout the day.
While the bid-ask spread is a compensation to limit order traders for providing liquidity immediacy, it is a cost for market order traders. +Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) , Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (1999) , Bae, Jang and Park (2003) find that when the bidask spread is narrow and the order size is small, market orders are used more than limit orders. In other words, it is an optimal strategy to use market orders when the cost of doing so is low, and use the limit orders when the cost is high. Additionally, among the limit order traders, the competition to provide the liquidity is higher when the compensation, i.e., spread, of doing so is high. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 9:
There is a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and liquidity immediacy. Hypothesis 10: There is a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and market order ratio.
Data and Methodology

Data Description
The dataset provided by the SET contains orders and trades of all warrants and underlying stocks from January 2, 1997 until December 31, 1997. Each record of the order file consists of the order arrival time stamped to the nearest hundredth of a second, the order identification (ID), the buy-or sell-order indicator, the ordered price, the number of shares ordered, and the order instructions. The status of an order by the end of a trading day is also included in the order file. This order status can be only either one of the following four types: opened, matched order, canceled by firms, or canceled by the system. For the trade file, it reports the traded time, the trade ID, the traded price, trading volume in number of shares, and the IDs of the corresponding bid and ask orders.
The study covers the period starting from January 2, 1997 to November 1997. The month of December 1997 is truncated to control for the possible impact of the new ceiling floor rule implemented on December 1, 1997. Both warrants and their underlying stocks are used in the study. Figure 1 shows that during 1997 the average trading volume of warrant is on average 6,541 million baht a month, which is 51.3% of the volume traded by their underlying stocks. To provide comparisons of trading activities across different time periods, we collect the trading volume from 1994 to 1996 available on the Integrated Stock Exchange of Thailand Information Management System (usually called I-SIMS CDs) and compute the average monthly trading volume of warrants. During this period, the average monthly trading volume of warrants is about 4,473 million baht or 26.9% of the volume traded by their underlying stocks. These preliminary results show that the warrants on the SET are actively traded. In addition, the warrant to stock trading ratio in 1997 is almost doubled from the previous period. In fact on the month of July 1997, the trading volume of warrants even exceeds that of their underlying stocks. Recall that the 1997 financial crisis which swept countries through much of Asia was originated in Thailand when Thai government freely floated the baht on July 2, 1997. Hence the high trading activity of warrants supports the argument that traders use warrants to take an advantage of volatility trading.
[Insert Figure 1 here] For the intraday analysis, we choose a 30-minute interval to tradeoff between the nonsynchronous trading problem and stale trading problem. If the length of an interval such as one hour is chose, trades and quotes in the same interval but on different days may not be comparable. Besides using long intervals will end up with too few intervals per day, and the intraday variations may not be able to clearly stand out. On the other hand, if an interval such as one minute is used, order and trade related variable may be neither informative nor computed because too many intervals are without orders and/or trades.
Thirty-nine warrants are traded on the SET in 1997. A number of these warrants and their underlying stocks are not traded on every trading day. A recent study by Ding and Charoenwong (2003) show that the bid-ask spread of thinly traded futures contracts computed from days with trades are more informative than those computed from days without trades. In light of this finding, we impose the following criterion on the sample selection. Each of the sample warrants and underlying stocks must have at least 40 synchronously trading days of which each security has more than 20 trades on the day. This criterion reduces the data from 39 pairs of warrants and stocks to 26 pairs. As discussed in Section 2, securities with very low prices could be often constrained by the minimum tick size, and, consequently have very large relative spreads. To reduce the impact of the minimum tick size on the relative spreads, we do not include the trading days when either warrants or stocks are traded below 5 baht. This additional criterion further reduces the sample to 19 pairs of warrants and underlying stocks with an average of 129 trading days for each security.
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 2 shows detailed characteristics of the sample warrants and underlying stocks. Given the above sample selection criteria, it is not surprising that the sample securities mostly come from the finance and securities industry (11 out of 19) since the industry is the most actively traded on the SET. Most of the sample warrants are long-term call options whose maturity is ranging from about one year to almost five years. Given the long maturities, it is not surprising that most warrants were issued as deep-out-of-the-money options. The average prices of the warrants and underlying stocks varies from 9.10 to 85.57 baht and from 17.65 to 331.23 baht, respectively.
Limit Order Book Construction
Since the data do not explicitly provide us with bid and ask quotes, to get the spread and depth of a security, it is necessary to construct its limit order book from the order and trade files. Our method is similar to the limit order book construction of NYSE stocks used by Kavajecz (1999) . But unlike the trading system used by the NYSE, the ASSET clears all remaining orders in its system after market close. All securities traded on the SET start with a fresh, empty book at the beginning of each day. There is no need to estimate the initial balance of the book at the beginning of the day. Hence the limit order books we construct are not in error by the initial book estimation.
In the intraday analysis, we create the limit order book at the end of each trading interval by classifying all orders prior to the end of the interval into three categories: buy, sell, and canceled. The numbers of shares from the buy and sell orders are assigned to their corresponding prices in the limit order book. Then, we subtract the number of shares traded prior to the end of the interval from the number of shares available on both sides of the book. Because the traded or matched price could be better than the price of the trade-initiated order, we must give a careful attention when subtracting the traded shares from both sides of the order book. Fortunately, each trade record in the trade file provides the ID numbers of the buy and sell orders constituting the trade. These IDs allow us to determine the exact orders from which we are subtracting the number of shares traded.
While our database indicates which order was eventually canceled, it does not provide the time when it was canceled. Since the construction of the limit order book needs the cancellation time, we make the following assumptions. A canceled order that was never filled was immediately canceled after its submission. A canceled order that was partiallyfilled was canceled at the time of its last filled. With these assumptions, the simulated limit order book is essentially updataed faster than the true book. Since an order when it was canceled is more likely behind than at the market 3 , our assumptions would create a certain bias on the bid-ask spread and depths. While the total depth or thickness of the limit order book will be certainly underestimated, the market depth and the bid-ask spread may or may not.
Lastly, if traders use conditioned published orders, their existence will affect the accuracy of our limit order book. We can identify the time and the portion of a conditioned published order when it was matched, but not the time and the whole size of the order when it was originally submitted. The incomplete information on the conditioned published orders would affect the accuracy of our estimates, but the problem is not serious. The bid-ask spread will be unaffected since the transacted portion of the conditioned published order cannot be the front of the prevailing market quotes. While the total depth and market depth will be underestimated, they are not different from those displayed to the public.
After the limit order books become available at the end of each interval, we can measure bid-ask spreads, market depths, and total depths. The bid-ask spread is defined as the difference between the best bid and best ask prices divided by the midpoint of the quotes. The market depth is based on the total number of shares posted at the best bid and best ask prices. The total depth or thickness of the book is the total number of shares from orders currently standing in the book. In addition, we compute volatility, trading volume, and the market order ratio; where volatility is the average value of absolute returns, trading volume is the sume of trading volume in the interval and measured in terms of million baht, and the market order ratio is the market orders arrived in the interval divided by all orders arrived in the same interval.
Most of warrants and stocks in the dataset range in price from 10 to 50 baht, which have a minimum tick size from 0.50% to 2.50%. The warrants have an average spread of 2.70%, higher than the stocks spread of 1.70%. As mention earlier that the SET aim to uniform the percentage of minimum price change by using different tick size for different prices, the minimum price change is not uniform across prices. A stock with trading price of 5 baht have a minimum price change of 2% while a stock price of 20 baht has a minimum price change of 1%. Low priced securities tend to have a higher spread. The cross-sectional average market depths are 45,766 shares for warrants and 74,189 shares for stocks. In terms of volume, there are five warrants in the top 20 trading volume during 1997, indicating the relatively high liquidity of warrants compared to stocks.
[Insert Table 3 and Table 4 here] Table 3 and Table 4 report the cross-section descriptive statistics for the traded and quoted variables in the morning and in the afternoon trading session of warrant and stock respectively. We use the parametric paired t-test and the non-parametric signed rank test to test for the difference of variables in the morning and afternoon session. Warrant and stock have the higher number of orders in the morning than in the afternoon. The number of morning orders of warrant and stock are 366 and 331 orders, while the number of afternoon orders of warrant and stock are 264 and 229 orders. The proportions of fully executed order are higher in the morning than in the afternoon by 9.04% for warrant, and 4.21% for stock. Both stock and warrant have the higher rate of marketable order arrival and the larger marketable order size in the afternoon than in the morning. A comparison of order file in the morning and in the afternoon suggests the possibility of intraday variation of orders.
The absolute spread is computed by the difference between the best ask and best bid, and the relative spread is the absolute spread divided by the average of the bid and ask. The relative spreads of warrant are 2.92% in the morning and 2.41% in the afternoon. Similarly, the relative spreads of stock are high in the morning, 1.86% and fall by 0.36% to 1.50% in the afternoon. Similarly to the relative spread, the absolute spread is higher in the morning than in the afternoon. The market depth, a sum of the shares standing at the best bid and the best ask of limit order book, is lower in the morning than in the afternoon. The morning market depth of warrant is 42,411 shares, and it rises by 7,547 shares to 49,960 shares in the afternoon. The market depths of stock are 65,582 shares in the morning and increase by 19,367 shares to 84,948 shares in the afternoon.
We also compute two other types of depth. The displayed depth refers to the orders standing in the book that are visible to the trader. Specifically, the displayed depth is the sum of the orders at the best three quotes on the bid and the ask side. The total depth is the average total limit orders in the book. Both displayed depth and total depth of warrant and stock are statistically higher in the afternoon than in the morning. We define a liquidity immediacy to investigate whether an increase of total depth mostly arise from the depth at the market or from the depth away from the market. Liquidity immediacy is defined as the ratio between the market depth and the total depth in the order book. For warrant, the morning liquidity immediacy is 8.36% and it significantly falls to 6.57% in the afternoon. Stock has the morning liquidity immediacy at 11.73%, but it slightly rises to 11.84% in the afternoon. From the comparison of the order book in the morning and in the afternoon, it becomes evident that the characteristic of order book may follow the time-varying pattern. A further test and discussion of time-varying pattern of the order book is shown in the later part of the paper.
The number of trades of warrant is higher than the stock trades, and the trades occur more frequently in the morning than in the afternoon. There are 270 and 206 trades of warrant, and 231 and 195 trades of stock in the morning and afternoon respectively. Trade size measured in number of shares is higher for warrant than stock. The warrant trade sizes are 2,708 and 2,628 shares, while the stock trade sizes are smaller at 1,976 shares and 2,081 shares for the morning and afternoon session accordingly. Furthermore, warrant has a positive return in the morning and negative return in the afternoon, but the stock does not have a statistically different between morning and afternoon return. Both stock and warrant have a higher return volatility in the morning than in the afternoon.
Intraday Variation Analysis
This section describes the regression used in the intraday variation analysis of spreads, depths, liquidity immediacy, volume, volatility, and market order ratio of the warrants and their underlying stocks traded on the SET. Each of the variables is regressed against two control variables and a set of dummy variables to capture both intraday and interday patterns. Specifically, the model is specified as follows. where Y t is the variable of interest, which are the bid-ask spread, market depth, displayed depth, total depth, liquidity immediacy, volatility, order volume, and market order ratio. The regularity patterns are captured by the 9 intraday 30 minute dummy variables (dtime) and the 5 day-of-the-week dummy variables (dweek). Each intraday interval is 30 minutes. To facilitate the interpretation of the dummy coefficients, we include the intercept and all dummy variables with a constraint that the sum of dummy coefficients in the same group is zero. This constraint helps to avoid the perfect multicollinearity. This scheme of dummy variables is used in several recent studies of intraday pattern, see Lehmann and Modest (1994) , Ahn and Cheung (1999) for example. We perform the regression for each security of 19 individual warrants and stocks. The intercept of the regression, α, represent the cross-sectional average value of the variable of intrest. Note that the number of observations in each stocks are not equal because the nonactive trading days are truncated.
Adverse Selection Component of Spread
Hypotheses that spread has a downward intraday pattern while market depth should have an upward intraday pattern are explained by Madhavan (1992) that the asymmetric information is resolved via trading. Whether the asymmetric information falls over the course of trading could be tested by computing the intraday variation of proportion of asymmetric component in spread. From the liquidity providers' point of view, spread compensates for three costs: order processing, inventory, and adverse selection. Among many decomposition models, we estimate the component of adverse selection cost from six widely cited models, in which the three models are based upon the trade price and the other three models make use of the quote midpoint price. A brief description explaining the model used in this section is presented in the paragraphs that follow.
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), MRR, derive the adverse selection using the price and trade indicator variables while allowing correlated order flow as follows. Jong, Nijman, Roell (1996) , DNR decompose the price effects of trading on the Paris Bourse into transitory and permanent parts. They extend the model of Glosten (1994) where there are no explicit order processing cost, and use the trade price, trade size, and trade indicator as the input variables as follows. where P t is the trade price at time t; Q t is the trade indicator variable; q t is the round lot trade size. We estimate this model using the OLS and adjust the standard errors with Newey-West (1987) method. Glosten and Harris (1988) 's model, GH, is one of the earliest decomposition models. Their model is based on the trade indicator variable, which could be specified into the DNR context as follows.
where P t is the transaction price at time t; Q t is the trade indicator variable; q t is the trade size measured in multiples of minimum trading units, which is 100 shares. The adverse selection component is z 0 + z 1 q t ; the order processing component is c 0 +c 1 q t . George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) , GKN, allow the serial dependent of expected return to have the same impact on the trade and quote mid point returns. The model is as follows.
where P t is the transaction price at time t; Q t is the trade indicator variable; M t is the quote mid point; s q is the quoted spread. The order processing cost and adverse selection cost are β and α. Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995), LSB, develop empirical estimates of the bid-ask spread component following Huang and Stoll (1994 ), Lin (1992 ), and Stoll (1989 . In their model, the quote revision changes in response to a trade, and the revision is a fraction of the effective spread.
where P t is the transaction price at time t; M t is the quote mid point. The adverse selection cost is α. Huang and Stoll (1997) , HS reconcile the decomposition model based on the trade indicator and quote mid point and develop the general model which allows a three-way decomposition of the adverse selection, inventory, and order processing cost as follows.
where Q t is the trade indicator variable; M t is the quote mid point; S t is the quoted spread prior to trade; π is the probability that the trade indicator at time t is opposite in sign to the trade indicator at time t-1. The parameters α, β, and 1-α-β refer to the adverse selection cost, the inventory holding cost, and the order processing cost respectively. We estimate the model using the GMM with Newey-West (1987)'s Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) covariance matrix.
Empirical Results
Intraday Pattern of Spreads
From the regression in equation 1, the cross-sectional average spread of warrant is 2.70%, wider than the 1.70% of stock spread. The relative spread of stock on the SET is higher than the 0.6% of stocks spreads in NYSE, and higher than 1.15% of stock spreads in Japan, but lower than 1.73% of stock spreads in Hong Kong. 4 The intraday variation of relative spread of warrant and stock are shown in Table 4 and Table 5 . The relative bid-ask spread is at the highest during the period from 10:00 to 10:30 AM. Warrant and stock spreads in this period are 1.13% and 0.71% higher than the average relative spread in other periods. The dummy coefficients of other intervals are weakly negative, and some of them are statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the dummy interval coefficient is monotonically declining to the lowest value of -0.45% for warrant and -0.24% for stock during the last 30 minute of the trading day. Hence the spreads of both warrant and stock have a similar downward pattern over trading time, where spreads are the highest right after the opening, and lowest before the market close.
This result confirms the market structure effect to the intraday pattern documented in Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) . The options traded on the CBOE which is the competitive dealer market have the narrower spreads at the closing period compared to wider spreads of their underlying stocks traded on the monopoly specialist NYSE. In contrast, warrants and their underlying stocks listed on the SET are traded under the same market structure and regulation, and both exhibit the same intraday reverse J-shape pattern. The finding of spreads pattern of stock is similar to the bid-ask spread pattern on the NYSE, Japan, and Hong Kong, see McInish and Wood (1992) , Lehmann and Modest (1994) , and Ahn, and Cheung (1999). The impact of market closure also appears at the day of the week pattern. As shown in Table  4 .3 and Table 4 .4, the spreads of warrant and stock spreads are at the highest on Monday, and they are 0.25% and 0.06% higher than other days of the week.
[Insert Table 4 and Table 5 here]
Intraday Pattern of Depths
While spread is the most popular proxy for the price of liquidity, depths of the limit order book measure the size of liquidity. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1994) show that providers of liquidity use both depths and spreads to manage their asymmetric information risk. We use four variables to constitute for depths. Three variables are market depth, displayed depth, and total depth. The fourth variable is the ratio of the market depth to total depth. Essentially it is the market depth relative to the total depth, and we call it "liquidity immediacy". A comparison of liquidity immediacy across different periods could reveal the change of the market depth relative to the total depth. Table 4 and Table 5 show that the cross-sectional active trading day weighted market depths of warrant and stock are 45,766 shares and 74,189 shares. Active stock are likely to have thick depths and more number of active trading day, so stock has higher cross-sectional day weighted than the cross-sectional average market depth. The active trading day weighted displayed depths of warrant and stock are 188,825 shares and 190,710 shares, while the active trading day weighted total depth of warrants and stocks are 712,856 shares and 567,240 shares respectively. All three types of depth are low at the opening and continually increase and reach the highest at the closing. Compared to spread, the intraday pattern of market depth is a reverse image of intraday spread pattern.
[Insert Figure 2 here] In Figure 2 , the market depth is lowest at the opening and monotonically increases to the highest at the closing. The total depth also have similar upward intraday pattern. While both the market depths and total depths increase over the course of trading day, the liquidity immediacy of warrants monotonically declines, but the liquidity immediacy of stocks follow the U-shape pattern. The cross-sectional average of the liquidity immediacy of warrants and stocks are 7.56% and 11.78%. Liquidity immediacy ratio could be viewed as the proxy of the degree of willingness to supply liquidity of the limit order trader. The high liquidity immediacy indicates the high degree of competition between the limit order traders to supply the liquidity. The pattern of liquidity immediacy is similar to the pattern of spread, suggesting that limit order traders compete to supply the liquidity. Because spread is the compensation for liquidity supplier, wide spread and high liquidity immediacy reflects the higher competition among limit order traders. Comparing to the NYSE, our results are in line with result of Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1994) that the liquidity supplied by the limit order traders in the limit order book of warrants and stocks is reflected in both spreads and depths.The pattern of total depths and liquidity immediacy are shown in figure 3 .
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Intraday Pattern of Market Order Ratio
The average values of the market order ratio across all time intervals are 39.72% for warrants and 40.07% for stocks. From Table 4.4 and Table 4 .5, the market order ratio is lowest during the first 30-minute interval and increases over time to reach the highest at the last 30-minute interval. There is also a lunch break effect to the market order submission. After lunch, the market order ratio drops during the next 30-minute interval before increases again. During afternoon session, the pattern of market order ratio is the U-shape. An increase of market order submission is consistent to the increase of market depths and the decrease of spreads. Market order traders consume the liquidity supplied by the limit order traders. The intraday pattern of spreads, depths, and market order submission support the hypothesis that the investor strategically submit more (less) market when the spread which is the cost of submission is low (high) and when the market depths is high (low), see Bias, Hillion and Spatt (1995) and Bae, Jang, Park (2003) . Keim and Madhavan (1995) show that the institution trader who is the liquidity trader such as the index fund managers tend to use the market orders. This observation is consistent to our result of that shows a large increase of market order during the closing. A comparison of market order ratio between warrants and stocks are shown in figure 4. The figure shows the similarity of intraday pattern of market ratio between warrant and stock.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Intraday Pattern of Volatility and Volume
It is well known that the intraday pattern of returns, volatility, and volume follow the U-shape pattern.
5 Harris (1986 Harris ( , 1989 , Brook and Chiau (1995) and Vijh (1988) document that the increase in NYSE stock prices on the last trade of the day come from the increase of trades at ask prices, which may reflect the demand to cover their short selling position or the intention to affect the closing price. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) explain the high opening return as a result of information asymmetry arising from the concentration of informed trading at the opening. As noted in Brock and Kleidon (1992) and Gerety and Mulherin (1994) and others, the accumulation of the overnight information and the inability to trade hinder the price discovery process and cause the deviation from optimal portfolio, resulting in the high opening volatility and volume.
According to Table 5 and Table 6 , the coefficients of the volatility and order volume are statistically positive at the first and the last trading intervals. Consistent to previous study, the volatility of both warrants and stocks exhibits the U-shape pattern. The volatility at the first trading interval of the day is the highest level and it falls as time goes by before it increases again at the closing interval. The impact of trade discontinuity due to the 2 hours lunch break appears in the intraday volatility pattern that is the higher in the volatility during the first 30-minute in the afternoon session. Large firm is likely to have a smaller volatility. Furthermore, we find the similar evidence of the U-shape pattern in order volume, confirming the same pattern found in many other markets including US that has the specialist and dealer to provide the liquidity of the last resort, and on the pure limit order market such as Japan, Paris Bourse, and Hong Kong. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that the intraday variation of warrant and stock follow the U-shape pattern.
[Insert Figure 5 and Figure 6 here]
Adverse Selection Proportion of Spread
We compute the cross-sectional descriptive statistics and intraday variation of the proportion of asymmetric information for all six models. The three models, MRR97, DNR96, and GH88, use only trade data are highly significant with a strong positive correlation among themselves. The other three models, GKN91, LSB95, HS97, employ both the trade and quote data, and their estimates are positively significant with moderate correlation. As shown in table 7, the cross sectional mean of the adverse selection proportion varies from 12.6% to 60.9% for warrant, and from 13.5% to 47.9% for stock. The maximum estimations come from the GKN91 model, while HS97 model gives the minimum estimation. The adverse selection cost proportions estimated from other models are in between 10% to 30%.
[Insert Table 7 here] Table 7 shows that the adverse selection cost proportions are usually at the highest after the market opens by 30 minute. Most of the models show that the lowest adverse selection proportions occur at the closing intervals. Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) , for instance, show that the adverse selection cost of warrant and stock consists of 23.3% and 31.6% of total spread during the opening period. These proportions fall to 19.1% and 15.3% at the closing period for warrant and stock respectively.
The findings are consistent with the explanation that the adverse selection cost declines over time. Madhavan (1992) notes that adverse selection problem is resolved by trading. This implies that the adverse selection component at the open is higher than trading interval during the day, and it is lowest at the close. Other models report the higher adverse selection component at the close. This might be a result from the strategic order submission of informed traders. Handa and Schwartz (1996) , and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) show that limit orders placed at the best or better than the prevailing quotes yield superior return to the limit orders placed behind the book and market order. As a result, to maximize their information benefit, informed trader may use a marketable limit order, but if no execution occurs, before the market close, they may switch to use the market order for immediate execution. As a result, liquidity provider before the close will demand a compensation for a higher asymmetric information cost. However, as noted in Ahn, et. al. (2002) , all of the models considered here assume that the information is immediately impounded to price after each trade. If the trading pattern is endogenously determined and lagged trades and quotes have an impact to current trade and quote, the vector autoregressive model of Hasbrouck (1988) may be more appropriate.
Association of Spreads, Depths, Liquidity Immediacy, and Market Order Ratio
The results of the intraday pattern in the previous section show that over the trading day spread, and liquidity immediacy decline, while market depth, displayed depth, total depth, and market order ratio have the upward pattern. This section presents the correlation between spreads and other variables including depths, immediacy, and market order ratio when the intraday pattern is and is not controlled. Without a control of intraday interval, there is no evidence of a relevant association between spreads and market depths for both warrants and stocks. However, spreads are statistically negatively associated with total depth for both warrants and stocks. The correlations of spread and depth are -0.17 for warrant, and -0.14 for stock. Furthermore, the correlations of spreads and liquidity immediacy are statistically significant with the values of 0.21 and 0.19 for warrants and stocks. Lastly, the correlation of spread and market order submission are statistically significant with the values of -0.16 and -0.13 for warrants and stocks. However, it is possible that the correlation of spreads and the other variables arise purely from the strong relationship in a certain period of the day, especially from the opening and closing period. A close examination of correlation at each trading interval would confirm whether such relationships strongly occur at a specific period of trading day. From Table 8 , the association of spread and other variables across the time intervals of the day and across weekdays are not sharply different from the relationship without controlling the timevariation. This shows that the intraday effect has little impact to the relationship of spreads and other variables. Our results can be concluded as follows. First, spread has the negative association with total depths, which implies that the limit order traders use both spreads and depths to provide liquidity, consistent to the result reported by Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) . Second, spread has the positive correlation with liquidity immediacy, confirming the hypothesis of competition among the liquidity providers. Limit order traders receive the bidask spread to compensate for providing liquidity. When the compensation is higher, the limit order traders compete among themselves to offer more competitive price. Third, spread is negatively correlated to the market order ratio. This implies that the market order traders observe the spread and strategically design their strategy to minimize their trading cost. They prefer to use the market order when the cost of trading, measured by spread, is low.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides supporting evidence that the market structure has a significant effect to the intraday pattern of spread, depth, market order ratio, volatility, and volume. In other words, financial instruments traded under same market mechanisms should have the same pattern. Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995) find that the spread of the CBOE options is narrower at the close while the stock spreads are wider. They explain that the opposite closing pattern between options and stocks is a result of difference in market structure, which is the competitive dealers in CBOE, while the NYSE has a single specialist. Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) also show that the NASDAQ stocks have a narrow spread near the close due to absence of market power among the NASDAQ dealers. For both warrants and stocks, our results show wider spreads at the open and gradually narrower spread before the spread reach the minimum level at the close. Because warrants and stocks are traded under the same market structure, the similar pattern of intraday spreads adds the evidence to support the effect of market structure to influence the intraday pattern.
The intraday pattern of trade and quote variables for both warrants and stocks are compared. On the SET, five warrants are ranked in the top 20 trading volume during 1997, indicating the relatively high liquidity of warrants compared to stocks. Generally, the intraday spreads, depths, volatility, volume, and market order ratio of warrants and stocks have the similar pattern. The percentage spreads are the highest at the opening and monotonically decreasing during the later trading period and become lowest at the closing. Moreover, the warrants spread are higher than the stocks spread for all the period. The market depths, total depths and market order ratio are at their lowest level in the opening and increasing to the highest at the closing. The warrants volatility is higher than stocks and both have the U-shape pattern similar to the U shape pattern of return and volume. The intraday pattern of liquidity immediacy of warrants and stocks are different. For the warrants, the liquidity immediacy has a downward shape, while it is relatively constant for stock. One may interpret this difference that the competition to supply liquidity among limit order traders in warrant trading is not as high as in the stock. However, to confirm this hypothesis, a formal test is required and is subjected to future research.
The study further shows the negative association of spreads and total depths, spreads and market order ratio, and the positive association of spreads and liquidity immediacy. These three relationships prevail for all time intervals, so they do not occur because of the strong relation in a specific interval. The inverse relationship between spread and depth support the notion that limit order trader use both spread and depth to manage their submission strategy. However, there is an insignificant association between spreads and market depths. Consistently, the negative correlation of spreads and market order ratio implies the strategic market order submission. The positive association of spreads and liquidity immediacy can be interpreted as the competition among the limit order traders. The table presents the cross-sectional descriptive statistics of order file, limit order book, and trade file in the morning and afternoon session. Matched orders are the proportion of orders that are totally executed. Opened orders are the proportion of orders that are partially or never executed. Marketable orders are the orders that are executed immediacy after placed. Relative spread is the best ask minus the best bid prices divided by the mid point of the bid and ask prices. Absolute spread is the difference between the best bid and ask prices. Market depth is the sum of shares at the best quotes in the limit order book. Total depth is the total orders in the limit order book. Liquidity immediacy is the ratio between market depth and total depth. Mid-quote price is the average of best bid and best ask prices. The table presents the cross-sectional descriptive statistics of order file, limit order book, and trade file in the morning and afternoon session. Matched orders are the proportion of orders that are totally executed. Opened orders are the proportion of orders that are partially or never executed. Marketable orders are the orders that are executed immediacy after placed. Relative spread is the best ask minus the best bid prices divided by the mid point of the bid and ask prices. Absolute spread is the difference between the best bid and ask prices. Market depth is the sum of shares at the best quotes in the limit order book. Total depth is the total orders in the limit order book. Liquidity immediacy is the ratio between market depth and total depth. Mid-quote price is the average of best bid and best ask prices. De Jong, Nijman and Roell (1996) , Glosten and Harris (1988) , George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) , and Huang and Stoll (1997 The table reports the correlations of spread with market depth, total depth, immediacy and market order proportion for all 15-miniute intervals in a day. Spread is the different between the best ask price and bid price divided by the mid point of the bid and ask prices. Market depth is the number of shares at the best bid price and best ask price. Total depth is the number of shares standing in the limit order book. Immediacy is ratio between market depth and total depth. Market order proportion is the ratio between the number of market order arrival and the number of total order arrival. The reported correlations are the averages of correlations of individual warrants and underlying stocks. The statistical significance is based on the signed tests on individual correlations, where ** and * indicate 99% and 95% significance level respectively. Volume of warrants (thousand baht) Volume of stocks (thousand baht)
